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GREAT BEER, GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD 
LAW: THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
NEW YORK’S FARM BREWERY LICENSE 
Abstract: In January 2013, New York joined a recent legislative trend and adopted 
into law a farm brewery license. The law seeks to protect and promote New York’s 
brewery-related agricultural sectors by creating a new and cheaper “farm brewery” 
license that grants special privileges to licensees while mandating that they brew 
with in-state ingredients. This Note argues that, although well-intentioned, this leg-
islative adaption to the craft beer revolution is a protectionist violation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause. In doing so, this Note provides a background to alco-
hol regulation in the United States, outlines the tensions these regulations have with 
the Commerce Clause, and concludes that although states should promote craft 
brewing, they must do so legally, uniformly, and non-discriminatorily. 
INTRODUCTION 
The tension between state legislation and the Commerce Clause is deeply 
rooted in United States’ legal history.1 As is true in life as well as law, alcohol’s 
involvement has made the situation both more interesting and more conten-
tious.2 Because the Twenty-first Amendment constitutionalized state-level al-
cohol regulation, the tension between states’ robust alcohol regulatory schemes 
and the Commerce Clause’s proscription of state-level regulation of national 
commerce has been particularly sharp.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 198 (1824) (acknowledging tension between state 
regulation and the Commerce Clause, and first recognizing what would become known as the 
“dormant” Commerce Clause); Brannon P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: Pro-
legomenon to a Defense, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1804 (2004) (“Claims that the [dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine] has no basis in the original understanding of the Constitution's framers are often 
made, but not well supported.”). 
 2 See Kevin C. Quigley, Note, Uncorking Granholm: Extending the Nondiscrimination Principle 
to All Interstate Commerce in Wine, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1871, 1873–74 (2011) (demonstrating that alco-
hol regulation has often been the source of Commerce Clause litigation). See generally Elizabeth D. 
Lauzon, Annotation, Interplay Between Twenty-First Amendment and Commerce Clause Concerning 
State Regulation of Intoxicating Liquors, 116 A.L.R. 5th 149 (2004) (same).  
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, and stating that “[t]he trans-
portation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or 
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited”); id. amend. 
XVIII, repealed by id. amend. XXI (prohibiting the “manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicat-
ing liquors”). See generally Lauzon, supra note 2 (listing cases demonstrating tension between the 
Commerce Clause and state regulation of the alcohol industry).  
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As this battle over regulatory control of the alcohol industry has raged in 
the courts, American brewing has undergone an explosive revolution spurred 
by the advent of craft.4 A “craft brewery” is defined by its traditional, small, 
and independent nature: it must primarily brew with traditional ingredients 
using traditional techniques, must produce less than six million barrels of beer 
per year, and must not be more than twenty-five percent owned or controlled 
by a non-craft brewery.5 Approximately 2,768 craft breweries operated for 
some or all of 2013 (the highest total number at least since the 1880s), and in 
that same year the craft brewing industry grew 17.2% by volume.6 Conse-
quently, states have dipped into their reservoirs of legislative imagination to 
construct ways to encourage the development of this booming sector of the 
economy while maintaining their regulatory control.7 The results are mixed.8 
One regulatory development has come in the form of a “farm brewery li-
cense.”9 This license is both much cheaper than its traditional counterpart, and 
affords more flexible privileges in exchange for sourcing ingredients from 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465–66 (2005); see Economic Impact Data, BREWERS 
ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/economic-impact-data/, archived at http://perma.
cc/AXU5-2UCU (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) (calculating a $33.9 billion contribution to the U.S. econ-
omy from craft beer in 2012, with over 360,000 jobs created); see also History of Craft Brewing, 
BREWERS ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation.org/brewers-association/history/history-of-craft-
brewing/, archived at http://perma.cc/N3T8-XN92 (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
 5 See Craft Brewer Defined, BREWERS ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/craft-
brewer-defined/, archived at http://perma.cc/5WK7-2KHQ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). The require-
ment that brewers use traditional ingredients and techniques means, in essence, that they brew without 
adjuncts—that is, they primarily brew all-malt styles. See id. This requirement excludes flavored malt 
beverages. See id. In addition to these objective requirements, craft breweries are also marked by their 
innovative approach to brewing, their involvement in local community, and their “individualistic 
approaches to connecting with their customers.” Id. “The majority of Americans live within 10 miles 
of a craft brewer.” Id. 
 6 See National Beer Sales & Production Data, BREWERS ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation.
org/statistics/national-beer-sales-production-data/, archived at http://perma.cc/9ATU-3Q9X (last vis-
ited Jan. 12, 2015) (showing percentage of growth by volume); Number of Breweries, BREWERS 
ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/number-of-breweries/, archived at http://perma.
cc/NZ7E-JNLM (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) (showing the number of craft breweries operating in 2012 
and 2013 and noting a 15.3% increase in the number of craft breweries during that time). 
 7 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 465–66 (describing New York and Michigan distribution laws); Self-
Distribution Laws, BREWERS ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation.org/government-affairs/laws/
self-distribution-laws/, archived at http://perma.cc/L7FR-WM55 (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) (survey-
ing largely fragmented self-distribution laws among the states). 
 8 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466 (striking down New York and Michigan distribution laws); 
Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2010) (striking down a Massachusetts 
wine distribution law designed to remedy constitutional infirmities in a previously invalidated Massa-
chusetts wine distribution law); Quigley, supra note 2, at 1888 (noting continued pushback from states 
regarding alcohol regulation); Self-Distribution Laws, supra note 7 (demonstrating the patchwork and 
dysfunctional nature of fifty separate regulatory frameworks). 
 9 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 
504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533) (providing two key provisions in the New York farm brew-
ery legislation). 
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farmers within the state.10 For example, in order to promote its brewery-related 
agricultural sectors, New York’s law requires that farm brewers source 20% of 
their hops and barley from within the state for the first five years after the 
law’s enactment, then 60%, then eventually 90% after twenty years.11 As of 
June 2, 2014, thirty-five farm breweries operate in New York, which includes 
twenty-two established in 2013 alone.12 
Yet here familiar Commerce Clause jurisprudence sounds again: if out-of-
state hop and barley farmers wish to sell to these new brewers, they will face 
significant hurdles.13 Likewise, if these brewers source more than the approved 
quantity of out-of-state ingredients, they violate their license.14 Moreover, if 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See id. §§ 3, 51-a, 56; N.Y. TAX LAW § 1136(i)(1)(C) (McKinney 2014) (exempting farm 
breweries, wineries, cideries, and distilleries from tax filing provisions relating to information 
regarding sales of alcoholic products); NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR AUTH., COMPLYING WITH NEW 
YORK’S ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW—A GUIDE FOR WINERIES AND FARM WINERIES 11 
(2013), available at http://www.newyorkwines.org/Resources/9918908bf4a040f8b9458
63dcdac9a8e.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9K6L-QL9W (“‘Farm’ manufacturing licenses have 
more privileges than standard manufacturing licenses.”). Compare N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW 
§ 56(1)(a) ($4,000 annual license fee for traditional brewers that produce over 75,000 barrels per 
year), with id. § 56(1)(b) ($320 annual license fee for farm brewers). Massachusetts and Maryland 
have similar farm brewery laws. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 19c (West 2006 & Supp. 
2014); MD. CODE ANN., ALCO. BEV. § 2-209 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). New Jersey has proposed a 
similar statute as well. See S. 133, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014). 
 11 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; see Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, 
Governor Cuomo Welcomes 14 Licensed Farm Breweries in New York State (Oct. 9, 2013), available 
at http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-welcomes-14-licensed-farm-breweries-new-
york-state, archived at http://perma.cc/CXK4-FE9V. 
 12 Will Cleveland, Law Opens Door for Local Brewers, DEMOCRATIC & CHRON. (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/2014/06/01/farm-winery-law-rochester-breweries/
9835431/, archived at http://perma.cc/AYL7-BUQ4 (noting also that “[t]he rapid growth will only 
continue as more, including The Lost Borough in Rochester and Nedloh in Bloomfield, take ad-
vantage of the law”); see Farm Breweries Growing Fast in New York, BREWYORK (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://brewyorknewyork.com/post/77308095246/farm-breweries-growing-fast-in-new-york, archived 
at http://perma.cc/VP85-QER7; see also Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor 
Cuomo Announces 72 Percent Increase in Taste NY Farm-Based Beverage Licenses Since 2011 (Feb. 
3, 2014), available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-72-percent-
increase-taste-ny-farm-based-beverage-licenses-2011, archived at http://perma.cc/NNB3-XKQK 
(“There are currently 26 licensed farm breweries in New York, with more than a dozen applications 
currently in the pipeline.”) (emphasis added). 
 13 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; Cleveland, supra note 12 (quoting several com-
plaints that soon New York’s brewery-related agriculture will not be able to withstand growing de-
mand); infra note 151–154 and accompanying text (addressing various concerns that New York’s 
brewery related agriculture cannot meet the increase in demand that will be caused by the farm brew-
ery law’s graduating in-state sourcing requirements). 
 14 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 51-a(11) (“[N]o licensed farm brewery shall manufacture 
or sell any beer other than New York state labeled beer.”); id. § 3 (defining New York state labeled 
beer). 
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New York’s agricultural infrastructure cannot fully handle the increased de-
mand, problems will abound.15 
This Note argues that although New York and other states deserve praise 
for attempting to accommodate the art and industry of craft beer, they must do 
so constitutionally.16 Furthermore, this Note argues that protectionism is con-
trary both to the spirit of entrepreneurship and to the spirit of the craft beer 
revolution.17 Part I provides the historical backdrop on which this battle is 
fought.18 It examines the role of the dormant Commerce Clause, the function 
of the Twenty-first Amendment, and the tension between these provisions as 
altered in 2005 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Granholm v. Heald.19 Part II fo-
cuses on New York’s farm brewery law and compares it to the distribution 
laws that the Supreme Court struck down in Granholm.20 Part III argues that 
New York’s farm brewery license violates the dormant Commerce Clause and 
cannot be saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.21 Finally, it suggests that 
states should instead pursue simple deregulation as a way to foster craft brew-
eries constitutionally.22 
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, STATE REGULATION, AND ALCOHOL:  
A STORY OF TENSION 
The Commerce Clause is a primary font of congressional power.23 By 
way of over two centuries of changing economic landscapes and expansive 
judicial interpretation, it has produced a vast federal legislative and regulatory 
framework.24 This federal regulatory framework often and inevitably conflicts 
with state regulatory schemes.25 The resulting tension is particularly evident 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See infra notes 151–154 and accompanying text (explaining potential agricultural deficiencies 
in the farm brewery scheme). 
 16 See infra notes 185–268 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 185–268 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 23–104 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 23–104 and accompanying text.  
 20 See infra notes 105–184 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 185–268 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 252–268 and accompanying text. 
 23 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”); H.P. Hood & Sons, 
Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534–35 (1949) (“The Commerce Clause is one of the most prolific 
sources of national power and an equally prolific source of conflict with legislation of the state.”). 
 24 See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) (finding that this steady expansion of congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause was due in part to the “recognition of the great changes that 
had occurred in the way business was carried out in this country. Enterprises that had once been local 
or at most regional in nature had become national in scope.”). 
 25 See id. at 553–54 (“[T]he Court’s Commerce Clause decisions dealt but rarely with the extent 
of Congress’ power, and almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that 
discriminated against interstate commerce.”); H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 534–35 (demonstrating 
the conflict between state legislation and Congress’s plenary power to regulate interstate commerce). 
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with regard to alcohol regulation because the Twenty-first Amendment consti-
tutionalizes state-level regulation of the alcohol industry.26 This Part tells one 
sliver of this storied friction in three Sections.27 First, Section A briefly ex-
plains the origin, purpose, and scope of what is commonly referred to as the 
dormant Commerce Clause.28 Section B examines the history and current 
standing of the Twenty-first Amendment vis-à-vis the dormant Commerce 
Clause, and reviews how states have regulated the alcohol industry since its 
ratification.29 Finally, Section C explores how the U.S. Supreme Court handled 
these opposing forces in its most recent treatment of the topic.30 
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause: The Commerce Clause’s Murkier, 
Quieter, and Mischievous Other Side 
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate com-
merce “among the several States.”31 The U.S. Supreme Court, in some of its 
earliest cases, interpreted this positive power to also negate state action that 
interferes with interstate commerce or regulates it as only Congress may.32 
This logical corollary, commonly called the “dormant” Commerce Clause, has 
served as a jurisprudential tool of choice in the effort to harmonize a national 
economy populated by self-interested and highly sovereign states.33 The doc-
trine essentially teaches that states cannot adversely affect the cohesion and 
fluidity of a single, national economy—that is, they cannot economically Bal-
kanize the nation.34 
                                                                                                                           
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or 
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the 
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”); see Quigley, supra note 2, at 1880–81 (tracing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the Twenty-first Amendment). 
 27 See infra notes 31–104 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 31–50 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 65–104 and accompanying text. 
 31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . . .”). 
 32 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137–38 (1986) (noting that the Commerce Clause both 
bestows positive power on Congress and also restrains state regulatory power); Lewis v. BT Inv. 
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980) (same). Chief Justice John Marshall formulated this founda-
tional doctrine early in the Court’s history in striking a New York permitting scheme that unduly 
regulated interstate shipping. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 198; see also Quigley, supra note 2, 
at 1874–75 (2011) (summarizing dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
 33 H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 535 (“Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written 
word, this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given 
to these great silences of the Constitution.”). 
 34 See id. at 537–38 (“This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the 
gamut of powers necessary to control the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs 
barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic 
units.”) The point here, at heart of the doctrine and at the heart of this Note, is that the Constitution 
guarantees a single, unified, unobstructed national economy—that the Framers intended as much, and 
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Violations of the dormant Commerce Clause typically come in two forms, 
with two corresponding levels of judicial scrutiny.35 First, there are state laws 
that, even if facially neutral, discriminate against interstate commerce in pur-
pose or effect.36 These are held to heightened scrutiny with an almost insur-
mountable presumption of invalidity.37 Second, there are state laws that merely 
burden interstate commerce.38 These are instead subjected to a more lenient 
                                                                                                                           
that this power was considered to be one of the most essential contrasts to the failed Articles of Con-
federation. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). The vehemence with which 
this congressional power is defended is therefore tantamount to its importance. See id. (“The Constitu-
tion was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed 
upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long 
run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”). 
 35 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (outlining the analytical framework for the dormant Commerce 
Clause, stating that when “determining whether a State has overstepped its role in regulating interstate 
commerce, this Court has distinguished between state statutes that burden interstate transactions only 
incidentally, and those that affirmatively discriminate against such transactions”); Catherine Gage 
O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 573–74 (1997). 
 36 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138; Alexandra Thompson, Note, The Legacy of Granholm v. Heald: 
Questioning the Constitutionality of Facially Neutral Direct-Shipping Laws, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
309, 323–24 (2010). A state law can discriminate against interstate commerce in three ways: either 
facially (that is, discriminatory in its very language), effectually (that is, it appears neutral but it has a 
discriminatory effect), or purposefully (actually passed with a discriminatory purpose). See Thomp-
son, supra at 523–24. In reality, plaintiffs allege (and defendants defend) dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges with a large variety of interlocking doctrines relating to whether certain industries are 
“similarly situated,” whether the state benefit is a tax subsidy (and under Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, sometimes immune from the dormant Commerce Clause), or whether a law’s intent (and the 
means of determining that intent) need be distinct from—or is related to—the laws’ effect. See, e.g., 
General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298–99 (1997) (“Although this central assumption [that 
discrimination assumes substantially similar entities] has more often than not itself remained dormant 
in this Court’s opinions on state discrimination subject to review under the dormant Commerce Clause 
. . . there is a threshold question whether the companies are indeed similarly situated for constitutional 
purposes.”); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (“Direct subsidization of 
domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition [of regulating interstate commerce 
clause in a discriminatory way] . . . .”); Jenkins, 592 F.3d at 11 n.11, 13–14 (2010) (noting potentially 
important distinctions made by courts between a challenged law’s effect and its purpose, and describ-
ing a holistic methodology for determining a law’s purpose). For purposes of both brevity and rele-
vance, this Note does not fully flesh out these (and other) nuances in dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence; rather, this Note argues that the New York farm brewery law—given its facial and effec-
tual discriminatory aspects, and given that New York and out-of-state hop farmers are obviously “sim-
ilarly situated”—remains unconstitutional even in light of these defenses. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. 
LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 
533) (explicitly regulating similarly situated economic actors to the determinant of out-of-state actors 
and to the benefit of in-state actors); infra notes 185–268 and accompanying text. 
 37 See O’Grady, supra note 35, at 573–74. This is not to say that the Court simply invalidates all 
facially discriminatory state laws without inquiry. See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151. Instead, the Court 
applies a strict test whereby the government must show that the law, though discriminatory, serves a 
non-discriminatory, a non-protectionist purpose, which itself could not be effectuated without a less 
discriminatory method. See Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 422 (2008). 
 38 See Thompson, supra note 36, at 323. 
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balancing test formulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1970 decision Pike 
v. Bruce Church, Inc.39 Given heightened scrutiny’s always-fatal effect, a 
court’s threshold determination of a challenged law’s status is outcome deter-
minative.40  
In explaining which of these two levels of scrutiny apply, the Court has de-
fined “discrimination” straightforwardly.41 A state law is discriminatory if it 
treats in-state and out-of-state economic interests differently so as to benefit the 
former and burden the latter.42 Notably, discriminatory laws in this context do 
not have to be intentional or malicious, although evidence of either intent or mal-
ice is predictably relevant.43 Instead, they merely need to treat a kind of com-
merce differently because of its state identity.44 By formulating such a broad ju-
risprudence, the Court arguably takes a hard, more scrutinizing look at discrimi-
natory state laws in the dormant Commerce Clause context than in others.45 
Clarity, however, is not the dormant Commerce Clause’s virtue.46 States 
continue to test its amorphous boundaries, and courts continue to struggle with 
its application.47 Changing economies and industries only further complicate 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legit-
imate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”); Thompson, supra note 36, at 323. 
 40 See O’Grady, supra note 35, at 574. A finding that a state law is in fact discriminatory is al-
most always fatal to that law; the chance the state is afforded to demonstrate otherwise is, as one 
scholar puts it, “illusory.” Id. at 574 n.12 (citing multiple cases where courts have struck down state 
laws on a per se basis upon a finding of discrimination under a Commerce Clause analysis). The test 
of whether a law is in fact discriminatory is however unclear. See Thompson, supra note 36, at 323. If 
the law makes it past this stage without invoking the heightened standard, its chances of survival are 
greatly increased. Denning, supra note 37, at 422 (describing the Pike balancing test—whereby the 
challenger of a law must prove that that the burdens on interstate commerce are clearly excessive in 
relation to putative benefits—as deferential); O’Grady, supra note 35, at 574. 
 41 See O’Grady, supra note 35, at 578. 
 42 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (“As we use the term 
here, ‘discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic inter-
ests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is 
virtually per se invalid.”); see O’Grady, supra note 35, at 578. 
 43 See O’Grady, supra note 35, at 578. This indifference to—or more precisely, the unnecessari-
ness of—intent as an element of discrimination in the dormant Commerce Clause context contrasts 
with the concept of discrimination in other constitutional contexts, such as Equal Protection, in which 
a law’s intent to discriminate against a class of persons is highly relevant. See id. at 578 n.26. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. at 578 n.26; see also Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 117–23 (1988) (fleshing out more extensively the juxtaposition of intent and judi-
cial review in Equal Protection and Commerce Clause doctrines).  
 46 Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 203 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[N]o body 
of our decisional law has changed as regularly as our ‘negative’ Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”); 
Denning, supra note 37, at 422–23 (noting the lack of clarity or logical cohesion in the dormant 
Commerce Clause decisions, concluding that many decisions are irreconcilable). 
 47 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 496 U.S. at 203 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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the matter, especially when other constitutional doctrines are implicated.48 
Given arguably inconsistent and expansive Supreme Court decisions in seem-
ingly similar fact patterns, further analysis is better situated in highly specific 
factual settings rather than in the abstract.49 It can confidently be said, howev-
er, that given the dormant Commerce Clause’s serpentine history, and the in-
herent fragility of most constitutional test-based jurisprudences, it is likely the 
doctrine’s future will be equally as opaque.50 
B. The Twenty-first Amendment: A Power (Maybe) Delegated to the States 
The Twenty-first Amendment, appearing much further down the timeline 
of constitutional history, put an end to America’s disastrously failed experi-
ment with Prohibition.51 Instead of merely repealing the Eighteenth Amend-
ment (which constitutionalized Prohibition), the Amendment also contains a 
lesser known second and heavily litigated provision, referred to here as the 
“Second Provision.”52 This Provision states that “[t]he transportation or impor-
tation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery 
or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited.”53 
This famously controversial and somewhat ambiguous Second Provision 
gives states a higher degree of regulatory authority.54 That is, although states 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See id. (“Change is almost [the dormant Commerce Clause’s] natural state, as it is the natural 
state of legislation in a constantly changing national economy.”). 
 49 See Denning, supra note 37, at 422 (“[Dormant Commerce Clause] rules are easy to recite, but 
their application is notoriously difficult, resulting in cases with similar facts being decided differently, 
and the different outcomes justified on the basis of tendentious distinctions.”). 
 50 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 496 U.S. at 203 (Scalia, J., concurring); Denning, supra note 37, at 
428–52 (explaining the convoluted history of the dormant Commerce Clause and describing a theory 
of “constitutional calcification,” whereby constitutional tests or jurisprudential frameworks erode with 
time in a predictable matter—a sort of shelf life for constitutional doctrines). 
 51 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The outright failure of the temperance movement’s attempt to ban-
ish alcohol is widely acknowledged as simple fact. See, e.g., Gordon Eng, Note, Old Whine in a New 
Battle: Pragmatic Approaches to Balancing the Twenty-First Amendment, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, and the Direct Shipping of Wine, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1849, 1860–62 (2003) (tracing the 
history of the temperance movement and its unequivocal failure); Clayton L. Silvernail, Comment, 
Smoke, Mirrors and Myopia: How the States Are Able to Pass Unconstitutional Laws Against the 
Direct Shipping of Wine in Interstate Commerce, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 499, 512 (2003) (“In fact, Prohi-
bition was a colossal failure.”). 
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. The Eighteenth Amendment, before being repealed, 
prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors. Id. amend. XVIII 
(repealed 1933). 
 53 Id. amend. XXI, § 2.  
 54 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484 (“The aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to allow States to 
maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, im-
portation, and use.”). But see Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984) (“It is by now 
clear that the Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the 
ambit of the Commerce Clause.”). 
2015] New York’s Farm Brewery Law and the Dormant Commerce Clause 321 
regulated the alcohol industry before Prohibition, the constitutionalization of 
this practice solidified an arguably unprecedented authority to do so as aggres-
sively as they wished.55 
Although such a doctrine may seem odd today, one must understand that 
public and governmental distrust of the alcohol industry persisted despite 
enormous dissatisfaction with Prohibition.56 Fears of organized crime and 
widespread intemperance—sentiments that spurred Prohibition in the first 
place—endured.57 To protect against such evils it was thought necessary to 
allow states the power to regulate every aspect of the industry, including the 
power to prohibit alcohol.58 As a result, the alcohol industry emerged from the 
shadows of Prohibition as one of the most heavily and sporadically regulated 
sectors of the economy.59 As is to be expected with heavy state regulation, liti-
                                                                                                                           
 55 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (articulating a view that the Twenty-first 
Amendment provides states with nearly unmitigated authority to regulate alcohol); see infra notes 75–
91 and accompanying text (explaining the perspective that the Twenty-first Amendment grants states 
near-plenary power to regulate alcohol). 
 56 See Marcia Yablon, The Prohibition Hangover: Why Are We Still Feeling the Effects of Prohi-
bition, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 552, 553 (2006) (“Over time, the purpose behind the ratification and 
then repeal of National Prohibition has been forgotten by the majority of Americans. Currently, Pro-
hibition is most often referred to as a ‘failed experiment’ or a ‘strange aberration’ in our country's 
history. However, although Prohibition was the culmination of the temperance movement’s goals, the 
temperance movement itself was nothing new. This movement had been an important and accepted 
part of American society since the early Nineteenth Century.”) (emphasis added); Andrew Tamayo, 
Comment, What’s Brewing in the Old North State: An Analysis of the Beer Distribution Laws Regu-
lating North Carolina’s Craft Breweries, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2198, 2209–12 (2010) (tracing the historical 
roots of modern state alcohol regulation, and noting the societal mores which dominated at the time of 
repeal). 
 57 See Tomayo, supra note 56, at 2209–12. Of particular importance was the work of a leader of 
the Temperance Movement, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., who commissioned a report called “Toward 
Liquor Control.” See id. at 2209. See generally RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD 
LIQUOR CONTROL (1933) (demonstrating the Temperance Movement’s perspective on alcohol). This 
report polled expert and public opinion towards the alcohol industry and in turn laid the intellectual 
foundation upon which modern state alcohol regulation would be founded. See Tomayo, supra note 
56, at 2209–11. One key tenet of this foundation was a robust licensing system for alcohol manufac-
tures. See id.; see also Yablon, supra note 56, at 555–67 (describing the social context and content of 
the prohibition movement); infra notes 111–137 (outlining New York brewery licensing scheme). 
 58 See Yablon, supra note 56, at 594–95 (“In the period following the repeal of Prohibition, alco-
hol consumption in the country was at the lowest levels it had ever been and many states remained 
completely dry long after repeal. Oklahoma did not repeal its statewide Prohibition until 1959 and 
Mississippi remained dry until 1966.”); Tomayo, supra note 56, at 2209–11; see also Granholm, 544 
U.S. at 494–95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he moral condemnation of the use of alcohol as a bever-
age represented not merely the convictions of our religious leaders, but the views of a sufficiently 
large majority of the population to warrant the rare exercise of the power to amend the Constitution on 
two occasions.”) Also demonstrating the social mores of the time, the Twenty-first Amendment is the 
only constitutional amendment to have been ratified by the people in state conventions, rather than by 
state legislatures. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 59 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing as examples certain state laws 
regarding alcohol, including prohibition of sale on Sundays, prohibition of hard liquor specifically, 
and the infamous three-tier system). The three-tier system, adopted at least in part in every state, is 
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gation flourished—litigation which to this day continues to etch out the exact 
boundaries of state authority under the Twenty-first Amendment.60 
Meanwhile, roughly over the last thirty years and most prominently in the 
last ten, a highly popular craft beer revolution has taken the alcohol industry 
by storm.61 In just a few decades, the American beer landscape has been trans-
formed from one in which a few large breweries dominated the market with 
largely indiscernible product to one populated by thousands of breweries rep-
resenting unprecedented creativity, historical reinterpretation, variety, locality, 
and entrepreneurship.62 This revolution has forever changed the culture and 
mechanisms of the beer industry, which no longer resemble the market as it 
was when the Twenty-first Amendment was enacted in 1933.63 The laws and 
regulations stemming from the Second Provision are struggling to keep up.64 
                                                                                                                           
one of the most litigated aspects of these states’ laws. See Quigley, supra note 2, at 1882. Generally, 
the system, in an attempt to prevent crime or corruption and to encourage temperance, legally requires 
manufactures to sell only to wholesalers, who in turn sell to retailers, who in turn sell to consumers. 
Id. Vertical integration between these tiers is forbidden. Id. 
 60 See generally Lauzon, supra note 2 (listing well over a hundred cases in just the Commerce 
Clause context of state alcohol regulation). 
 61 See History of Craft Brewing, supra note 4.  
 62 See Shirley Chen, Note, Craft Beer Drinkers Reignite the Wine Wars, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. 
REV. 526, 539–40 (2014) (noting the previous lack of diversity and recent rise of craft styles); David 
R. Scott, Comment, Brewing up a New Century of Beer: How North Carolina Laws Stifle Competition 
in the Beer Industry and How They Should Be Changed, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 417, 417 
(2013); History of Craft Brewing, supra note 4 (“The history of craft brewing saw America’s brewing 
landscape start to change by the late-1970s. The traditions and styles brought over by immigrants 
from all over the world were disappearing. Only light lager appeared on shelves and in bars, and im-
ported beer was not a significant player in the marketplace.”). There were 2,403 breweries in opera-
tion for at least part of 2012 in the United States; forty-six percent of these breweries were mi-
crobreweries; and a majority of Americans by estimate live within ten miles of a brewery. Scott, supra 
at 417. These statistics are most compelling when compared to the fact that in 1979, there were only 
forty-four operating breweries in the U.S. See Tamayo, supra note 56, at 2212. Necessary to under-
standing the simultaneously consolidating nature of the brewing market is the fact that even though 
the number of small breweries has shot upward, so has the market share of the largest five breweries, 
which was 87.2% in 2001. See id.; see also Nick Cibula, Note, It’s Always a Good Time for Beer, but 
What About the Hops?, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 157, 157–59 (2013) (describing massive consolidation 
among the major players in the beer market).  
 63 See History of Craft Brewing, supra note 4; see also Tamayo, supra note 56, at 2199. There is a 
widely held belief that craft beer began with Jack McAuliffe’s New Albion Ale in 1977, which, though 
commercially unviable, laid the foundation for stronger pillars of the craft beer movement: Jim Koch’s 
Boston Beer Company in Boston, MA and Ken Grossman’s Sierra Nevada in Chico, CA. See Tamayo, 
supra note 56, at 2199. Also belonging among these names is Jeff Labesch’s New Belgium Brewing, in 
Fort Collins, CO. See Our History, NEW BELGIUM BREWING CO., http://www.newbelgium.com/
brewery/company.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/46JC-QFT (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
 64 See infra notes 111–137 and accompanying text (outlining New York’s farm brewery licensing 
mechanism). 
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C. Alcohol and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Storied Rivalry, and 
Granholm’s “Reconciliation” 
On one hand there is the dormant Commerce Clause, dictating national 
unity on economic policies.65 On the other is the Second Provision of the 
Twenty-first Amendment, providing states an often utilized and constitutional-
ly guaranteed right to regulate alcohol within their borders.66 From such obvi-
ous adversity well over a hundred cases have sprung.67 
More specifically, the passage of the Eighteenth and the Twenty-first 
Amendments, along with the related Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, afforded 
alcohol special status in any Commerce Clause analysis.68 That is, historically 
and constitutionally speaking, alcohol is not merely just another item in com-
merce.69 And although the extent of this unique status remains the heart of the 
uncertain and unresolved tension between the Commerce Clause and Second 
Provision, today the Commerce Clause appears to be winning.70 
This trend is best told in two parts.71 Subsection 1 discusses the Court’s 
non-deferential treatment of alcohol regulation prior to the Temperance 
Movement and the Eighteenth Amendment.72 It then examines the Court’s ear-
ly interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment as a blanket delegation of 
nearly plenary regulatory power to states.73 Subsection 2 explains the Court’s 
partial rejection of this old model and its adoption of a modern, balanced ap-
proach—and explains how this modern approach tilted even further in the 
Commerce Clause’s favor in Granholm.74 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See supra notes 31–50 (outlining the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 66 See supra notes 51–64 (outlining Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence). 
 67 See Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71 (collecting cases); James J. Williamson III, Case-
brief, Raise Your Glass: The Third Circuit Holds New Jersey Wine Laws in Violation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause and Leaves Room for a Future Challenge of the Direct Shipment Ban, 56 VILL. L. 
REV. 753, 754–55 (2012) (noting tension between the dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-
first Amendment and concluding that reconciliation does not leave “an easy choice”). 
 68 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; id. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933); Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, 
37 Stat. 699 (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2012)) (affording states greater regulatory control of alco-
hol within their borders); Wilson Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 313 (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2012)) 
(same); Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71 (describing the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts and 
how they singled out alcohol and afforded it special status for regulatory purposes); infra note 81–82 
and accompanying text (discussing the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts). 
 69 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 494 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71. 
 70 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476–89 (tracing the Court’s own jurisprudential history on this 
issue); Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2 at 162–71 (tracing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Twenty-
first Amendment and finding a consistent chipping-away at states’ plenary powers under the Second 
Provision). 
71 See infra notes 72–104 and accompanying text. 
 72 See infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 73 See infra notes 78–91 and accompanying text. 
 74 See infra notes 92–104 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Temperance Movement’s Rise and Fall 
Before the Temperance Movement garnered enough strength to pass the 
Eighteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court treated alcohol like any other 
commodity in interstate commerce.75 It was thus subjected like any other 
commodity to the dormant Commerce Clause.76 That is, the Court would strike 
down discriminatorily improper regulation of the national alcohol industry like 
it would any other similarly improper law—even those which today would 
seem perfectly commonplace.77 
Alcohol’s quotidian status changed with the rise of the Temperance Move-
ment.78 The Temperance Movement in the United States was born out of grow-
ing public dismay over what was perceived to be alcohol’s corrosive effect on 
societal morality.79 Construing causation between intoxication and criminality, 
national opinion shifted dramatically enough to move Congress to action.80 
The major acts Congress passed in response to this movement were the 
Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, which essentially closed loopholes in state 
alcohol laws opened by the U.S. Supreme Court with various dormant Com-
merce Clause analyses.81 In substance, these laws are congressional delega-
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476–78 (relating pre-Prohibition jurisprudence); Lauzon, supra note 
2, § 2a at 164 (“Before the enactment of the Twenty-first Amendment, and disregarding the interlude 
of the Eighteenth Amendment, alcohol was treated as any other article of commerce, and therefore the 
power of the states to control the liquor traffic was subordinated to the right of free trade across state 
lines as embodied in the Commerce Clause.”). 
 76 Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–231. This does not mean that it was treated like any other 
commodity by the states; since the Civil War the Temperance Movement had marched on this “com-
modity” with fervor. See Autumn R. Veatch, Comment, Where Does the Commerce Clause End and 
the Twenty-First Amendment Begin Under Bainbridge v. Turner?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 111, 115–16 
(2004). 
 77 See, e.g., Bowman v. Chicago, 125 U.S. 465, 500 (1888) (striking down an Iowa statute that 
required all liquor importers to have a permit); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 461 (1886) (strik-
ing down tax targeting importers); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123, 128 (1880) (same); see also 
Quigley, supra note 2, at 1875 n.40 (collecting cases).  
 78 See Tamayo, supra note 56 at 2207–09. The Temperance Movement was a nation-wide move-
ment organized on the principles of sobriety and dedicated to abolishing what they perceived as 
America’s collective alcoholism. Id. 
 79 See id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, 37 Stat. 699 (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2012)); Wilson Act 
of 1890, 26 Stat. 313 (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2012)); Granholm, 544 U.S. at 478, 481. The Wil-
son Act overruled the Supreme Court’s 1890 decision in Leisy v. Hardin, specifically allowing states 
to regulate imported liquor on the same grounds as domestic liquor. See 26 Stat. 313; Leisy v. Hardin, 
135 U.S. 100 (1890); Granholm, 544 U.S. at 478. When the Supreme Court ruled that the Wilson Act 
did not prevent direct shipments of alcohol to persons for personal use or otherwise discriminate 
against interstate commerce, Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act. See 37 Stat. 699; Rhodes v. 
Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 421 (1898) (discussing the Wilson Act and emphasizing that despite that Act, 
consumers have a right to receive direct shipments of liquor in interstate commerce); Vance v. W. A. 
Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 455 (1898) (same); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 92–3 (1897) (strik-
ing down a South Carolina dispensary law that favored its own alcohol industry and holding that dis-
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tions of regulatory power to states, allowing them to regulate interstate com-
merce in liquor to the same extent they could regulate similar intrastate com-
merce.82  
Although the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts vested in states strong and 
special regulatory power, they were rendered temporarily moot with the pas-
sage of the Eighteenth Amendment.83 With the alcohol industry banned, the 
dormant Commerce Clause was irrelevant in this context.84 Prohibition turned 
out to be, however, a misguided disaster.85 Thirteen years after its enactment, 
the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment, 
which also contained the aforementioned and troublesome Second Provision.86 
In the early cases interpreting the relationship between this Second Provi-
sion and the newly relevant dormant Commerce Clause, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that states possessed near-plenary power to regulate alcohol as they 
wished.87 The Second Provision of the Amendment was thus interpreted as a 
broad and nearly unqualified delegation of authority to states, immunizing al-
cohol regulations from the dormant Commerce Clause.88 In other words, the 
Twenty-first Amendment was interpreted as a constitutionalized form of the 
Webb-Kenyon Act.89 Though no longer banned, alcohol remained a very dif-
                                                                                                                           
crimination against out of state alcohol industries is not protected by the Wilson Act); see also 
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 479–81 (discussing these cases). This law, after surviving a constitutional 
challenge, effectively closed the loophole left by the Wilson Act. See 37 Stat. 699; James Clark Distil-
ling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 332, (1917) (upholding constitutionality of the Webb-
Kenyon Act); see also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 481 (observing this evolution). This broad delegation of 
regulatory control served as the basis for the Court’s early interpretation of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment. See 37 Stat. 699; 26 Stat. 313; Granholm, 544 U.S. at 481. 
 82 See 27 U.S.C. §§ 121, 122 (2012); Granholm, 544 U.S. at 481; Jenkins, 592 F.3d at 18. Be-
cause the dormant Commerce Clause is a default rule reserving national commercial regulatory power 
in Congress, specific delegation of that power to the states effectively obviates the need for dormant 
Commerce Clause scrutiny. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91–92 
(1984) (holding that such a congressional delegation must be “expressly stated.”). In other words, 
there is no need to protect what Congress has given away. See id. 
 83 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933) (constitutionalizing Prohibition); Lauzon, supra 
note 2, § 2a at 162–71. 
 84 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484. 
 85 See Tamayo, supra note 56, at 2209 (“Prohibition brought an increase in organized crime and a 
wide and flagrant disregard for the law, which had the more subtle and pernicious effect of undermin-
ing public confidence and respect for police authority.”). 
 86 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484. 
 87 See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936), abrogat-
ed by Granholm, 544 U.S. 460; see also Quigley, supra note 2, at 1879 (describing the Court’s ap-
proach to the Twenty-first Amendment shortly after its passage as being highly deferential to state 
legislation). 
 88 See Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. at 62–63 (holding that had the challenged law been before 
the court before the Twenty-first amendment, it would have been struck under the Commerce Clause, 
but that this amendment “confer[s] upon the state the power to forbid all importations which do not 
comply with the conditions which it prescribes”). 
 89 See Veatch, supra note 76, at 120–21 (noting the similarity between the “Second Provision” 
and the Webb-Kenyon Act). 
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ferent kind of commodity, and its regulators were afforded special deference.90 
This interpretation, however, would not last forever.91 
2. The Modern Approach to the Second Provision 
With continued pushback, this broad interpretation of the Twenty-first 
Amendment eventually gave way to a more tempered approach.92 It was re-
placed with a narrower reading of the Second Provision and a balancing test, 
dubbed by one observer the “modern accommodation standard rule.”93 Ac-
cording to this approach, courts do not simply uphold any state regulation of 
alcohol as valid under the Second Provision, but instead determine 1) whether 
the regulation violates the dormant Commerce Clause, and if it does 2) wheth-
er the regulation can be “saved” by the Second Provision.94 To determine 
whether the Second Provision will in fact rescue the endangered law, the court 
determines whether the “core concerns” of the Twenty-first Amendment are 
implicated by the state’s regulation.95 Although undefined, these “core con-
                                                                                                                           
 90 Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–231 (listing cases and demonstrating that alcohol is afforded 
special attention in Commerce Clause analyses).  
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. With its 1945 decision in United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., the Court hinted at a 
potential vulnerability in the broad Twenty-first Amendment framework. See 324 U.S. 293, 299 
(1945); Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71. This vulnerability was further exposed in the Court’s 
1964 decisions in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. and Craig v. Boren, each expanding 
on the idea that the Twenty-first Amendment does not necessarily trump other parts of the Constitu-
tion. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206–07 (1976); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor 
Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332–33 (1964); Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71. 
 93 See Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71. A key ruling leading to this conclusion was the 1984 
Supreme Court decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd., which formulated this balancing test. See 468 U.S. 
at 275–76 (“The central purpose of [the Second Provision] was not to empower States to favor local 
liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition. It is also beyond a doubt that the Commerce 
Clause itself furthers strong federal interests in preventing economic Balkanization. State laws that 
constitute mere economic protectionism are therefore not entitled to the same deference as laws enact-
ed to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.”) (internal citations omitted); see 
also Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 404 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is by now clear that the [Twenty–
First] Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of 
the Commerce Clause.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 94 See Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71; see, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. 
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 584 (1986) (recognizing the modern accommodation standard); 
Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332 (explaining that separate parts of the Constitution must accommodate one 
another). 
 95 See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (“The two North Dakota regula-
tions fall within the core of the State's power under the Twenty-first Amendment. In the interest of 
promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue, the State has estab-
lished a comprehensive system for the distribution of liquor within its borders. That system is unques-
tionably legitimate.”); Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 404 (“This is commonly referred to as the ‘core con-
cerns’ test, which entails assessing whether state statutes reflect the ‘central purpose’ or the ‘core 
concern’ of the Twenty–First Amendment, viz., the promotion of temperance. Some courts have also 
recognized the prevention of monopolies or organized crime from (re)gaining control of the alcohol 
industry and the collection of taxes as other policies effectuated by the Twenty-First Amendment.”); 
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cerns” have included the promotion of temperance, market orderliness, and 
revenue.96 With frequent application, it seems this more balanced approach has 
been firmly established as the modern mechanism by which courts analyze 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges in the alcohol industry.97 
Importantly, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently ruled on 
states’ regulatory power over the alcohol industry in Granholm.98 There, the 
Court found New York and Michigan distribution laws that afforded in-state 
wineries the right to sell product directly to consumers while denying this priv-
ilege to out-of state wineries unconstitutional.99 Although the Court did not 
explicitly overrule its precedent, it did strike the challenged distribution laws 
as violations of the dormant Commerce Clause without explicitly appealing to 
the “core interests” of the Twenty-first Amendment.100 Instead, it mentioned 
the test in passing and moved on without explicitly applying it.101 Thus, it 
would seem that appeal to these core interests is no longer a necessary compo-
nent of the modern approach.102 If this is the case, the Court in Granholm has 
built a new framework, one which affords the Second Provision even less def-
erence, and which steps a bit further away from those forces which disturbed 
the dormant Commerce Clause in the first place.103 The “modern accommoda-
tion rule” would therefore imply a process whereby the Court bends the Twen-
ty-first Amendment to accommodate the Commerce Clause—limiting prior 
language mandating balance, and imperiling states’ rights to regulate alcohol 
freely.104 
                                                                                                                           
Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The core interests protected by the Twenty-
first Amendment are described as the States' interests in promoting temperance, ensuring orderly mar-
ket conditions, and raising revenue, all in connection with the manufacture, shipment, and use of alco-
holic beverages.”) (internal quotations omitted); Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71. 
 96 See Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71; supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 97 See Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71; supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
 98 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 486–89 (providing the modern approach to the Second Provision). 
 99 See id. at 493. 
 100 See id. at 487–88 (noting Bacchus, but not directly applying it); Quigley, supra note 2, at 
1886–87 (proffering idea that the Court implicitly rejected the modern balancing test). 
 101 See Granholm 544 U.S. at 487–88; Jenkins, 592 F.3d at 21 (“In any event, it is unclear that 
this balancing test survives Granholm.”). 
 102 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487–88; Jenkins, 592 F.3d at 21; Quigley, supra note 2, at 1886–
87. 
 103 See Granholm 544 U.S. at 487–88; Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71; Quigley, supra note 
2, at 1886–87. 
 104 Compare Granholm, 544 U.S. at 486 (“Our more recent cases, furthermore, confirm that the 
Twenty-first Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, 
does not displace the rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own produc-
ers.”), with Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332 (“Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be considered 
in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.”). 
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II. THE “FARMER BREWER”: A NEW KIND OF LICENSE,  
AN OLD KIND OF SCRUTINY. 
State regulation of the alcohol industry is extensive, varied, and sporad-
ic.105 It is also, much like the industry itself, a frequently changing area of the 
law.106 As breweries, wineries, and distilleries continue to evolve, so too do 
those laws which regulate their trade.107 This Part looks at one specific in-
stance of this evolution in the brewing context: the recently-enacted New York 
Farmer Brewer License.108 Section A examines how this license changes the 
law of brewing in New York and compares it to similar legislation proposed or 
enacted in Massachusetts and Maryland.109 Section B then places the law in the 
dormant Commerce Clause context, elucidating some of the law’s potential 
constitutional improprieties.110 
A. A New Kind of Brewing License 
Effective January 14, 2013, a new kind of brewing license exists in New 
York.111 Dubbed a “farm brewery license,” it is both cheaper than a standard 
brewer’s license and allows the licensee certain privileges in exchange for 
compliance with specific rules.112 In large part this new license is modeled af-
ter the state’s 1976 “Farm Winery Act,” and seeks to advance many of the 
same goals—namely, the encouragement and protection of New York indus-
tries, the increase of demand for locally sourced ingredients, and the expansion 
of tourism.113  
                                                                                                                           
 105 See John Foust, Note, State Power to Regulate Alcohol Under the Twenty-First Amendment: 
The Constitutional Implications of the Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement Act, 41 B.C. L. REV. 
659, 661 (2000) (noting the “virtual patchwork of local and state laws” that regulate the alcohol indus-
try); Liquor Laws by State, LEGALBEER.COM, http://www.legalbeer.com/liquor-laws-by-state, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/9SZ8-SYNF (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) (demonstrating different state laws 
regarding various aspects of alcohol regulation, including restrictions on alcohol contents, retail hours, 
dry counties, and home brewing restrictions, among others).  
 106 See Drew D. Massey, Dueling Provisions: The 21st Amendment’s Subjugation to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 7 TENN. J. BUS. L. 71, 78–112 (outlining the changing nature of state 
alcohol regulatory frameworks in the wine-shipping context). 
 107 See id. 
 108 See infra notes 111–184 and accompanying text. 
 109 See infra notes 111–137 and accompanying text. 
 110 See infra notes 138–184 and accompanying text. 
 111 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 504, 
506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533). 
 112 Id. §§ 3, 51-a, 56; see Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12. Although 
this Note is purposefully limited to the farm brewery license, it should be noted that the license is part 
of a larger farm manufacturing scheme which strikes a similar deal with farm cideries, distilleries, and 
wineries—with similar constitutional implications. See NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR AUTH., supra note 
10, at 12. 
 113 See Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12; Craig Gravina, The Ups and 
Downs of Farm-to-Glass, DRINKDRANK (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.drinkdrank1.com/2013/10/the-
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Specifically, the farm brewery license allows the licensee to operate a 
brewery for the manufacture of what it designates as “New York state labelled 
beer.”114 This designation is the heart of the new license.115 “New York state 
labelled beer” is beer that, until the end of year 2018, is brewed with at least 
20% New York-grown hops and “other ingredients” (meaning, in effect, most-
ly barley).116 The label then has a graduating effect: starting January 1, 2019, 
the percentage requirements are increased to 60% for both hops and barley, 
and then from January 1, 2024 and beyond, to 90%.117 
In exchange, farm breweries meeting these requirements are afforded ex-
clusive privileges.118 Most pertinently, they pay lower annual licensing fees 
and are exempted from “burdensome” tax rules that would otherwise require 
them to file information relating to sales tax.119 New York farm brewers may 
                                                                                                                           
ups-and-down-of-farm-to-table.html, archived at http://perma.cc/44ZY-A66X; Legislation, NEW 
YORK STATE BREWERS ASS’N, http://thinknydrinkny.com/about/legislation/, archived at http://
perma.cc/AZ6C-6YB4 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). Notably, the protectionist distribution laws the U.S. 
Supreme Court found unconstitutional in 2005 in Granholm v. Heald were actually provisions in the 
same Farm Winery Act on which the Farm Brewery License is modeled. See 544 U.S. 460, 470 
(2005) (striking down N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3(20–a), 76–a(3) (West Supp. 2005)). Though 
the Court struck down those provisions of the Farm Winery Act that granted in-state wineries distribu-
tion rights that were forbidden to out-of-state wineries, it never addressed those provisions that, simi-
lar to the farm brewery law, mandated that a certain percentages of grapes be grown in New York. See 
id. Consequently, although farm wineries remain outside the scope of this Note, protectionist sourcing 
requirements in the wine industry would be equally as unconstitutional as those in beer industry—and 
are subject to the same kind of analysis. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 76-a (outlining current 
farm winery license requirements); Granholm, 544 U.S. at 470. The same is true with regard to farm 
cider and liquor. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 58-c (concerning farm cidery and distillery 
licenses). 
 114 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 3. 
 115 See id. § 3; Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12. 
 116 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 3; Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra 
note 12. 
 117 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 3 (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 504, 506 
to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533). 
118 Compare id. § 51-a (describing farm brewery license), with id. § 51 (describing tradition-
al brewer’s license). See NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR AUTH., supra note 10, at 11 (“Farm manufac-
turing licenses have more privileges than standard manufacturing licenses.”). 
119 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 56 (listing an annual licensing fee of $320 for farm 
breweries and $4,000 for traditional breweries producing more than 75,000 barrels per year); 
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1136(i)(1)(C) (McKinney 2014) (exempting farm breweries, wineries, cider-
ies, and distilleries from tax filing provisions relating to information regarding sales of alco-
holic products); Legislation, supra note 113 (explaining that the tax filing requirement from 
which farm breweries are exempted is “costly and burdensome,” and that many farm breweries 
had “struggled to afford the costs of complying” with the requirement); see also Gail Cole, New 
York Exempts Farm Breweries from Tax Filing Requirements, TAXRATES.COM (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.taxrates.com/blog/2012/10/30/new-york-exempts-farm-breweries-from-tax-filing-
requirements/, archived at http://perma.cc/64JE-22V5 (explaining that farm breweries are 
exempted from certain tax filing requirements in order to “support local businesses”). Moreo-
ver, farm breweries may arguably sell both their own and other New York state labeled beer 
(and cider) at retail for on-premise consumption without accompanying requirements that 
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also, with no additional licensing, conduct tastings of New York labelled wine, 
cider, and liquor, and may sell these products at retail for off-premise con-
sumption.120 Although New York recently extended to all brewers the privilege 
to sell their product at retail for on-premise consumption (an important privi-
lege previously enjoyed exclusively by farm brewers), it remains clear that the 
farm brewery license, albeit now less attractive, grants its holder more eco-
nomic flexibility.121  
 Although the New York license is the most developed of its kind, it is not 
unique, as Massachusetts and Maryland (and potentially New Jersey) have 
similar schemes.122 Massachusetts, for example, issues a “farmer-brewery li-
cense” to applicants for the “purpose of encouraging the development of do-
mestic farms.”123 Similar to the New York scheme, the Massachusetts farmer 
brewery license allows for special privileges not extended to the standard 
“Manufacturing of Wine and Malt Beverage” license.124 In addition to simply 
being cheaper, these privileges include the right to sell beer made by the brew-
ery at retail for off-premise consumption, and immunization from pre-
                                                                                                                           
they also serve food. Compare N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 51 (traditional license, allowing for 
on-site retail sales if food is also provided), with id. § 51-a (farm brewery license, allowing for 
same retail rights without requirements regarding food). 
120 See id. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a, 56. 
121 See id. §§ 3, 51, 51-a, 56; NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR AUTH., supra note 10, at 12 (describ-
ing differences between the different liquor licenses). The very recent extension to all brew-
ers—not just farm brewers—of the right to sell one’s own product for on-premise consump-
tion mitigates the incentive to become a farm brewer. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 56 
(West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533) (amend-
ing brewing licenses to extend benefits to non-farm brewers, effective December 13, 2014). 
The fact remains, however, that the farm brewery license is much cheaper and, other than 
sourcing, is less stringently regulated. See id. §§ 3, 51, 51-a, 56; N.Y. TAX LAW § 1136(i)(1)(C); 
Legislation, supra note 113; see also Cole, supra note 119. 
 122 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 19c (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); MD. CODE ANN., 
ALCO. BEV. § 2-209 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). 
 123 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 19c. This law bears an illuminating history for the purpos-
es of this Note. See Andy Crouch, Why the ABCC Got It Right About Farmer-Brewers in Massachu-
setts, BEERSCRIBE (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.beerscribe.com/2011/08/09/why-the-abcc-got-it-right-
about-farmer-brewers-in-massachusetts/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z9PG-Z9TC. Generally speak-
ing, the license was created in the 1980s as an attempt to spur the brewing industry in the Common-
wealth. See id. Largely unused until the craft beer revolution began full force, it remained a difficult-
to-apply measure, with the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission (“ABCC”) at-
tempting to require at least some in-state sourcing, which proved infeasible given the Common-
wealth’s poor ecology for grain cultivation. See id. Though a new “brewpub” license was passed to 
help alleviate the concerns, the farmer-brewers license was never rescinded, and remains today the 
license of choice for Massachusetts craft breweries given its extension of benefits without exaction of 
cost. See id. The spirit of the law remains, however, rather unsatisfied given its original purpose. See 
id. 
 124 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 19 (describing standard brewing license), with 
id. § 19c (describing farmer-brewer license). 
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established quotas for so-called “pouring licenses.”125 The license thus intends, 
like New York’s, to extend greater flexibility to brewers that at least partially 
eschew out of state ingredients.126 
Notably, unlike the New York scheme, the Massachusetts license is large-
ly unenforced.127 This is because, unlike the New York license, the Massachu-
setts law does not specifically quantify the percentage of local ingredients 
needed to satisfy the license’s conditions.128 When the Massachusetts Alcohol-
ic Beverage Control Commission issued an advisory opinion denying a license 
to the then-upstart Idle Hands Brewery, it attempted to assert a new rule requir-
ing a minimum fifty percent in-state sourcing requirement.129 With ample 
backlash from legislators and the brewing community, however, the rule 
floundered, allowing for the continued operation of farm breweries without 
any special sourcing requirements.130 
Maryland’s recently-enacted Farm-Brewery license also lacks New York’s 
specific source-percentage quantification.131 Like the Massachusetts and New 
York schemes, the Maryland farm brewery license allows holders certain privi-
leges—on-site consumption and retail sales of growlers, cases, and kegs—in 
exchange for brewing their beer with “an ingredient from a Maryland agricul-
                                                                                                                           
 125 See id. §§ 19, 19c; see also John P. Connell, The Different Types of Brewery Licenses in Massa-
chusetts, LAW OFFICES OF JOHN P. CONNELL, P.C., http://www.connelllawoffices.com/the-different-
types-of-brewery-licenses-in-massachusetts/, archived at http://perma.cc/83YB-GHVS (last visited Jan. 
14, 2015). These quotas, applicable to the standard Manufacturing license, limit the total number of li-
censes available to pour alcoholic beverages in a given area. See Connell, supra. Immunization from such 
a quota therefore guarantees the famer-brewer the right to pour beer on-premises—a guarantee the stand-
ard license, distinct from any legislative purpose of promoting local farms, is without. See id. 
 126 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, §§ 19, 19c. 
 127 See Crouch, supra note 123, (describing the general failure of the original purposes behind the 
farm brewery license in Massachusetts); supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the Mas-
sachusetts farm brewers license). 
 128 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 19c (West 2006 & Supp. 2014) (stating only that the 
license is to be issued “[f]or the purpose of encouraging the development of domestic farms”); 
Crouch, supra note 123; supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the Massachusetts farm 
brewers license). 
 129 Bill Chappell, Small Beer Brewers Hit with ‘50 Percent Local’ Rule in Massachusetts, NPR 
(Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/08/05/139031233/small-beer-brewers-hit-
with-50-percent-local-rule-in-massachusetts, archived at http://perma.cc/VMC7-SB3J; Deron, Regu-
lation Without Thought, ANDOVER LIQUORS (Aug. 23, 2011), https://andoverliquors.wordpress.com/
2011/08/23/regulation-without-thought/, archived at http://perma.cc/3APB-KDMW (discussing the 
Idle Hands debacle). Idle Hands is a craft brewery focusing on Belgian styles, located in Everett, Mas-
sachusetts. See IDLE HANDS CRAFT ALES, http://www.idlehandscraftales.com/site/, archived at http://
perma.cc/7V9M-47WU (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). 
 130 See Crouch, supra note 123. This backlash included a vehement denunciation from then-
Senator Scott Brown of Massachusetts. Id. 
 131 MD. CODE. ANN., ALCO. BEV. § 2-209 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (requiring only that a farm 
brewery’s product “be manufactured with an ingredient from a Maryland agricultural product, includ-
ing hops, grain, and fruit, produced on the licensed farm”). 
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tural product.”132 Finally, proposed legislation in New Jersey would create a 
cheap “farm brewery license,” the details of which remain hazy but which 
would, in present form, require the licensee to grow on-site ingredients used in 
the manufacture of the beer.133 
Thus, although the New York farm-brewery license does not stand alone, it 
is the most quantified and elaborate of its kind.134 Predictably, public reaction to 
the new license has been mixed.135 Despite uncertainties of the law’s viability, 
however, it has led to rapid expansion: since it took effect in January of 2013, at 
least thirty five farm breweries have opened in New York, contributing to a dou-
bling of hop acreage in the state.136 Given the nature of the still-booming craft 
beer revolution, this expansion can only be expected to grow—at least while the 
farms can produce amply, and while the law remains unchallenged.137 
B. An Old Kind of Constitutional Scrutiny 
 Although, like its counterparts in other states, New York’s farm brewery 
license has yet to be constitutionally challenged, it likely will be.138 This Sec-
tion foreshadows that challenge and explores how courts are likely to examine 
the law.139 Subsection 1 discusses the reasons for challenging the farm brewery 
license scheme.140 Then, Subsection 2 compares the relatively new in-state 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See id.; Greg Kitsock, Maryland Beer: New Law Is a License to Swill (Onsite), WASH. POST 
(June 4, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-we-can-eat/post/maryland-beer-
new-law-is-a-license-to-swill-onsite/2012/06/01/gJQAfxYm7U_blog.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/9CHR-QV3D. It should be noted that this requirement is far less stringent that those provided by 
New York’s law. Compare MD. CODE. ANN., ALCO. BEV. § 2-209 (requiring only that a single on-site 
ingredient be used), with N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 3(West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 
1 to 504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533) (providing stringent in-state sourcing requirements).  
 133 See S. 133, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014). 
 134 See supra notes 111–121 and accompanying text (describing the New York farm brewery 
license and its graduating in-state source requirements). 
 135 See, e.g., Gravina, supra note 113 (expressing reservations about the law); supra note 113 and 
accompanying text (discussing various concerns with the law). Much of this criticism comes not nec-
essarily from the purpose of the law, but rather its ecological feasibility. See Gravina, supra note 113. 
Some maintain that New York will be unable to meet the increased demand this law will impose on 
farmers, and argue that the effects will be felt by the far more belabored barley market in New York 
(relative to the more robust hop market). See Cleveland, supra note 12; Gravina, supra note 113; su-
pra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 136 See Cleveland, supra note 12 (reporting the number of farm breweries as of June 2, 2014); see 
also Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12 (noting that hop acreage has doubled 
as of October 9, 2013). 
 137 See Cleveland, supra note 12; Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12. See 
generally Cibula, supra note 62 (providing an overview of the tight nexus between the brewing and 
agricultural sectors). 
138 Cf. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 465–66 (challenging a discriminatory New York law); see infra 
notes 142–158 and accompanying text (outlining the complaints likely to be lodged against 
the license from both out-of-state farmers and local farm breweries). 
139 See infra notes 142–184 and accompanying text. 
140 See infra notes 142–158 and accompanying text. 
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sourcing requirements to the distribution schemes that have already undergone 
stringent constitutional analysis.141 
1. The Motivation for Challenge 
At first blush, New York’s farm brewery license seems a creative and rea-
sonable legislative adaptation to a new kind of brewing phenomenon.142 Gen-
erally speaking, the response from the brewing community has been positive, 
encouraging, and excited—earning an implicit stamp of approval from the 
New York State Brewers Association and the national Brewers Association.143 
At second glance, however, concerns begin to emerge.144 For example, 
although a requirement that hops and other ingredients be sourced from in-
state farms certainly benefits those farms, a necessary secondary effect is that 
out-of-state farms will suffer weakened demand from a growing sector of New 
York’s brewing industry.145 This effect is compounded by the license’s graduat-
ing scheme.146 In other words, until the end of 2018, out-of-state farms will be 
forced to compete for 80% of a farm brewery’s malt and hop requirements; 
starting January 1, 2019, these out-of-state farms will then be forced to com-
pete for only 40% of New York farm brewery’s demand; finally, starting Janu-
ary 1, 2024, merely 10% of the farm brewery’s sourcing demands will be open 
to out-of-state farmers.147 
This restriction placed on out-of-state farmers will be of course partially 
alleviated by the continued expansion of the ranks of New York farm brewer-
ies, but in the final analysis such expansion further compounds the prohibitive 
effect.148 With the opening of each additional farm brewery, an eventual ninety 
percent of that brewery’s additional sourcing demand is fenced off from all 
                                                                                                                           
141 See infra notes 159–184 and accompanying text. 
 142 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 504, 506 
to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533); N.Y. Governor Cuomo Signs Craft-Friendly Bill, BREWERS ASS’N, 
http://old.brewersassociation.org/pages/government-affairs/current-issues/show?title=ny-governor-
cuomo-signs-craft-friendly-bill, archived at http://perma.cc/2BHQ-KDKW (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). 
 143 See Legislation, supra note 113; N.Y. Governor Cuomo Signs Craft-Friendly Bill, supra 
note 142. But see Cleveland, supra note 12 (expressing doubts about the law’s feasibility in its 
current form, given the burdens placed on New York farms). Brewers associations are essentially 
trade guilds that seek to promote craft beer policies and best practices, and have become increas-
ingly influential with the rise of the craft beer movement. See Purpose, BREWERS ASS’N, http://
www.brewersassociation.org/brewers-association/purpose/, archived at http://perma.cc/V5JJ-FKTG 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2015). The Brewers Association is the largest and most influential of its kind. 
See id. 
 144 See infra notes 145–158. 
 145 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 3. If by definition “New York state labelled beer” is made 
up of primarily NY ingredients, then the logical corollary is that it is not primarily made up of out-of-
state ingredients. See id. 
 146 See id. § 51-a. Perhaps a better word is “accelerated.” See id. 
 147 See id. 
 148 See id. 
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non-New York farms.149 The law therefore benefits some and neglects oth-
ers.150 
Moreover, the neglected out-of-state farmers may not be the only ones to 
complain.151 Indeed, there is credible concern that New York farms will be un-
able to withstand the increased demand from emerging farm breweries, espe-
cially as that demand is exponentially increased via the step-like nature of the 
law.152 If such ingredients are simply wanting—or if limited supply and in-
creased demand lead to prices so high as to be unobtainable by an inherently 
small farm brewery—the law’s prohibition on selling non-New York state la-
beled beer might face a challenge from the farm breweries themselves.153 This 
precise concern, after all, prompted the vehement backlash from Massachusetts 
breweries when that state’s Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission attempt-
ed to bolster its own farm brewery licensing mechanism with actual in-state 
sourcing requirements.154 
Thus the New York law, as it stands, might prompt a disagreeable re-
sponse and consequently birth a new round of litigation challenging state alco-
                                                                                                                           
 149 See id. 
 150 See id. 
 151 See O’Grady, supra note 35, at 578–79 (hypothesizing a challenge by in-state bakeries against 
a fictional state law requiring in-state ingredients). It is important not to overstate the issue, for in New 
York, Massachusetts, Maryland, and New Jersey there are other licensing mechanisms unencumbered by 
sourcing requirements (though encumbered by different requirements, such as a higher cost). See Con-
nell, supra note 125; see also MD. CODE. ANN., ALCO. BEV. § 2-209 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (outlin-
ing production brewery license requirements in Maryland). Although these alternative (or traditional) 
licensing and permit schemes do alleviate some of the harm done to out-of-state farmers, the point re-
mains that these out-of-state farmers are, insofar as the New York farm brewery market is concerned, 
barred significant access. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through 
L.2014, chapters 1 to 504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533). 
 152 See Gravina, supra note 113 (characterizing the New York agricultural infrastructure as “woe-
fully under equipped to even meet the first quota” mandated by the law). New York’s law—unlike 
some of its peers—does not require that farm breweries be located on actual farms, which expands 
their potential numbers and increases the burden on the already-strained infrastructure. See N.Y. AL-
CO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 51-a (authorizing non-farm breweries to hold farm brewery licenses); Gravina, 
supra note 113. Nor will this be a problem easily solved: barley—a principal ingredient in beer and 
subject to the law’s sourcing requirements—does not grow well in New York’s climate. See Gravina, 
supra note 113. Further, hops—a second principal ingredient and also subject to sourcing require-
ments—are more easily grown in New York, but at present the farms are far smaller than their larger 
Pacific Northwest or European competitors, and are arguably incapable of handling the increase in 
demand sure to come from their exclusive access to farm breweries. See id; see also Farm Breweries 
Growing Fast in New York, supra note 12 (“The problem these breweries may face, of course, is that 
those ingredients simply may not exist.”) 
 153 See Cleveland, supra note 12 (noting complaints from several farm brewers that the New York 
sourcing requirement will have to be changed if the license is to remain economically feasible). 
 154 See Deron, supra note 129; Crouch, supra note 123. During the immense public backlash 
against the Massachusetts ABCC’s attempt to impose a fifty percent rule on Massachusetts farm 
breweries, critics cited the unsettling practice where a farm brewer in Massachusetts was forced to 
grow barley, for no purpose whatsoever, except to meet certain sourcing requirements. See Crouch, 
supra note 123; supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text. 
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hol laws.155 Should these problems in fact be encountered—and non-New York 
farmers seek to sell their goods to New York farm brewers—the most obvious 
legal challenge that would follow will be grounded in the dormant Commerce 
Clause.156 
Such a new challenge is significant because, although much has been 
written both academically and judicially about the dormant Commerce 
Clause’s application to alcohol distribution mechanisms (often in the context 
of wine), the Clause has yet to be applied to modern in-state sourcing require-
ments in the craft beer context.157 Still, because the most pertinent and recent 
case law on this issue focuses on alcohol distribution, the farm brewery sourc-
ing trend is best analyzed by analogy to this field.158  
2. The Farm Brewery Law and the Three Tier System: Similarities and 
Differences 
The alcohol industry is broadly regulated by a three-tier distribution sys-
tem that has been adopted at least in part by all fifty states.159 The three-tier 
scheme generally dictates that licensed manufacturers of alcoholic beverages 
must sell to licensed wholesalers, who in turn sell to licensed retailers for sale 
to the general public.160 Prohibition of vertical integration between these tiers 
                                                                                                                           
 155 Cf. Crouch, supra note 123 (detailing push back against sourcing requirements in Massachu-
setts). Though in New York the small initial backlash was not as strong as, for example, in Massachu-
setts, this is because Massachusetts attempted to retroactively apply the scheme to already-existing 
breweries; in contrast, it is possible that New York, applying a new scheme prospectively to new 
breweries, has merely yet to encounter similar resistance. See Gravina, supra note 113 (highlighting 
New York’s under-equipped agricultural infrastructure and how it may fail to support the growing 
demand from New York farm breweries). 
 156 Cf. Granholm, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 
(2010); see infra notes 194–229 and accompanying text (arguing that New York’s farm brewery li-
cense runs into problems with the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 157 For examples of examinations and applications of the dormant Commerce Clause to alcohol 
shipment laws, see generally Granholm, 544 U.S. 460; Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1; Lloyd C. Anderson, Di-
rect Shipment of Wine, the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment: A Call for Legislative 
Reform, 37 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2004); Massey, supra note 106; Eng, supra note 51; Foust, supra note 
105; Gerald B. McNamara, Comment, Free the Grapes: The Commerce Clause Versus the Twenty-
first Amendment with Regard to Interstate Shipment of Wine in America, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 113 (2004); 
Russ Miller, Note, The Wine Is in the Mail: The Twenty-first Amendment and State Laws Against the 
Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2495 (2001); Silvernail, supra note 51; 
Thompson, supra note 36; Williamson, supra note 67. See infra notes 194–253 and accompanying 
text (applying the dormant Commerce Clause to the craft beer industry).  
 158 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484. 
 159 See id. at 466 (describing the three-tier distribution system); Quigley, supra note 2, at 1882 
(same). 
 160 Quigley, supra note 2, at 1882. 
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is designed to promote temperance and prevent monopolization and conse-
quent corruption.161 
Although the legitimacy of this system as a whole has been held perfectly 
valid, one of its particular iterations was struck down by the 2005 U.S. Su-
preme Court decision Granholm v. Heald.162 That case examined tweaks both 
New York and Michigan implemented in their three-tier systems that allowed 
in-state wineries to bypass the system—that is, sell directly to consumers—
while denying the same privilege to out-of-state wineries.163 The Court held 
that privileging only in-state wineries with direct access to consumers discrim-
inated against out-of-state wineries, and consequently violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause.164 It proceeded to hold that such a violation cannot be 
saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.165 
Thus, the most salient similarity between the New York farm brewery law 
and the struck distribution laws in Granholm is the implication of the Twenty-
first Amendment.166 Because New York’s law directly regulates the brewing 
industry, it will at least partially fall under constitutional protections guaran-
teed by the Second Provision.167 To at least some extent, therefore, the New 
York farm brewery law will be analyzed not under a traditional dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence but instead, like in Granholm, in light of the 
more complex nexus between the Commerce Clause and the Second Provision 
of the Twenty-first Amendment.168 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See id. (“States offer several policy justifications for the three-tier system. Funneling distribu-
tion through the relatively small number of wholesalers facilitates excise tax collection. Prohibiting 
vertical integration theoretically helps ‘prevent organized crime from gaining control of alcohol distri-
bution.’ By maximizing their oversight of distribution, states hope to limit illegal sales of alcohol to 
minors. Finally, by forcing the resale of alcohol through several tiers, states keep the price of alcohol 
artificially high, allegedly promoting temperance.”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE ANTI-
COMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE 5–6 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-report-concerning-possible-anticompetitive-
barriers-e-commerce-wine/winereport2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DP7H-ZXSW (explaining the 
purposes and mechanisms of the three-tier distribution system while studying potential barriers to 
trade in the alcohol industry). 
 162 See 544 U.S at 466 (striking provisions in New York and Michigan distribution laws). 
 163 See id. 
 164 See id. 
 165 See id. 
 166 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 
504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533); Granholm, 544 U.S at 466. Because the New York law at 
issue here is a state regulation of its alcohol industry, it implicates the Twenty-first Amendment, and 
thus implicates Granholm. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; Granholm, 544 U.S at 466. 
 167 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a. 
The extent of this protection is, however, highly dubious given the law’s stated purpose of protecting 
New York agriculture, not its brewing industry. See infra notes 230–251 (arguing that the Twenty-
first Amendment has less purchase in this context). 
 168 See Granholm, 544 U.S at 466; infra notes 194–253 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
scope of protections afforded by the Twenty-first Amendment to New York’s farm brewery law). 
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Additionally, both the laws struck in Granholm and the farm brewery law 
at issue here involve elements of protectionism.169 The former laws were ex-
plicitly intended to protect in-state wineries, whereas the latter is explicitly 
intended to protect in-state farmers.170 This is important because, as at least 
one scholar has noted, protectionism is a distinct issue in dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine that deserves distinct analysis.171 The Supreme Court has in-
deed directly addressed the role protectionism plays in the broader dormant 
Commerce Clause context.172 
A potentially important distinction, however, between the invalid law in 
Granholm and the farm brewery law at issue is the limited scope of the lat-
ter.173 Under the New York law, out-of-state farmers may still sell to other 
kinds of breweries and may still, in a limited way, market to farm breweries.174 
Thus, unlike at least the Michigan law in Granholm, there is no absolute pro-
hibition or denial of market access, only an encumbrance.175 Nor, importantly, 
is the sourcing requirement imposed on all New York breweries: it merely ap-
plies to those operating under a specific type of license.176 This limited and 
navigable aspect of the law is material given the Court’s observation in 
Granholm’s opening lines that direct sales were wholly “impractical” for out-
of-state wineries; obtaining a traditional license is not similarly “impractical” 
in New York.177 
Additionally, the farm brewery law is a less direct means of regulation in-
sofar as both the dormant Commerce Clause and the Second Provision might 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; Granholm, 544 U.S at 466 (describing the pro-
tectionist effects of the unconstitutional laws at issue in that case); Press Release, Governor Andrew 
M. Cuomo, supra note 12. 
 170 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; Granholm, 544 U.S at 466; Press Release, Gov-
ernor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12. 
 171 See O’Grady, supra note 35, at 577–603 (fleshing out distinctions between economic protec-
tionism and economic discrimination, and the roles of that distinction in the Commerce Clause analy-
sis). 
 172 See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) (finding unpersuasive the state’s 
argument that its law was permissible because it favored in-state products rather than disfavored out-
of-state products). 
 173 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 
504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533).  
 174 See id. § 51 (outlining the rules and procedures of the standard “Brewer’s license,” without 
mention of any sourcing requirements). Indeed, given New York’s insufficient agricultural infrastruc-
ture, most ingredients are in fact sourced from out of state. See Gravina, supra note 113. 
 175 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; Granholm, 544 U.S at 466. Arguably the out-of-
state wineries in Granholm only faced an “encumbrance” as well, but as here this “encumbrance” is 
better characterized, for practical purposes, as a denial of market access to a particular form of busi-
ness: direct sales to consumers. See Granholm, 544 U.S at 466–67. 
 176 Compare N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (requiring farm breweries to use an in-
creasing percentage of in-state ingredients), with Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) 
(discussing a law requiring Oklahoma utilities to use at least ten percent in-state coal). 
 177 Granholm, 544 U.S at 466. 
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be implicated.178 The invalidated distribution law in Granholm ran afoul the 
Commerce Clause by directly bestowing privileges exclusively on in-state 
wineries that it explicitly denied to out-of-state wineries.179 This was, in effect, 
a direct legislative attempt to favor in-state wineries with legislation that could 
very well have also benefited out-of-state wineries.180 In contrast, the farm 
brewery law extends benefits to certain kinds of in-state breweries that, only if 
accepted by the breweries, in turn have a secondary effect of burdening out-of-
state farmers.181 In other words, a brewer seeking to enter the industry may 
become either a farm brewer or seek a more traditional license, and it is only 
upon the brewer’s choice that New York ingredients are favored to their out-of-
state equivalents.182 This additional step and element of choice was notably 
absent in the Granholm decision.183 Thus there are both striking similarities 
and important differences between the three-tier distribution system struck 
down in Granholm and the newly signed New York farm brewery law.184  
III. CRAFT SHOULD BE UNFETTERED: FARM BREWERY LAWS LIKE NEW 
YORK’S VIOLATE THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Responding to rapid changes in the craft beer industry, some states, most 
notably New York, have created brewing licenses that are protectionist, dis-
criminatory, and wholly unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.185 Farm brewery laws are unconstitutional when coupled with in-state 
sourcing requirements because they either require or potentially require licen-
                                                                                                                           
 178 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; Granholm, 544 U.S at 466. This “directness” of 
the regulation is potentially relevant should a Pike balancing test—laden as it is with burdens and 
justifications—be relevant in a future challenge. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 
(1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and 
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on 
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”). 
 179 See Granholm, 544 U.S at 466. Indeed, as will be discussed further later, this is the kind of 
state legislation that draws particular attention from the federal courts. See O’Grady, supra note 35, at 
578–80; infra note 188 and accompanying text (explaining characteristics of dormant Commerce 
Clause violations). 
 180 See Granholm, 544 U.S at 466. 
 181 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 
504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533). This is relevant given its comparison to Wyoming, 502 U.S. 
at 433. See infra notes 222–226 and accompanying text (discussing that comparison). 
 182 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a. 
 183 See id. §§ 3, 51-a; Granholm, 544 U.S at 466. 
 184 See supra notes 159–184 and accompanying text (discussing the similarities and differences 
between the New York laws struck in Granholm and the New York farm brewery law). 
 185 See supra notes 111–121 and accompanying text (outlining New York’s farm brewery law); 
infra notes 194–229 and accompanying text (arguing that the New York farm brewery law is uncon-
stitutional).  
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sees to eschew ingredients from out-of-state farms.186 The stated intent of these 
licenses is to promote local industries to the detriment of other similarly situat-
ed—and unrepresented—non-local industries, which is the hallmark of 
dormant Commerce Clause violations.187 Section A of this Part analyzes New 
York’s license in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent formulation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause and Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence.188 
Section B then suggests a constitutional alternative that still promotes and sup-
ports the craft beer revolution: simple deregulation, sans burden.189 
A. The Unconstitutionality of the Encumbered Farm Brewer 
The protectionist and discriminatory nature of the farm brewery license is 
directly contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Granholm v. 
Heald, which examined the dormant Commerce Clause in the context of the 
alcohol industry.190 In that case, the Court reaffirmed the waning nature of the 
Twenty-first Amendment’s state-empowering Second Provision, and touched 
upon a two part test whereby these dueling constitutional provisions are bal-
anced.191 Specifically, the test requires courts to determine whether there has 
been a constitutional violation, and then whether the violation can be “saved” 
by the Second Provision.192 Subsection 1 shows how the New York Farm 
Brewery Law violates the dormant Commerce Clause, and Subsection 2 ex-
plains why the Second Provision cannot save it.193 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See supra notes 111–137 and accompanying text (describing the New York law); infra notes 
190–251 and accompanying text (arguing that the New York law is unconstitutional). 
 187 See Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12. This element of legislative 
self-protection is highly relevant in the dormant Commerce Clause context. See O’Grady, supra note 
35, at 582. Called the political process rationale or the inner political check doctrine, it generally dic-
tates that courts are highly concerned with legislation that benefits those intimately involved with the 
legislative process while burdening those with little to no voice in the system. See id. Admittedly, this 
doctrine also tends to curry judicial favor to statutes that distribute burdens to actors involved in the 
legislative process, which arguably the New York statute does via burdens placed on in-state farm 
breweries. See id. 
 188 See infra notes 190–251 and accompanying text. 
 189 See infra notes 252–268 and accompanying text. 
 190 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465–74 (2005); Quigley, supra note 2, at 1885–88.  
 191 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466–68; Silvernail, supra note 51, at 541 (noting the shift in the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence from absolutist to accommoda-
tionist); Massey, supra note 106, at 71 (tracing the Twenty-first Amendment’s gradual decline of 
influence.). 
 192 See Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71; Foust, supra note 105, at 683 (observing the devel-
opment of the “core interest” test). 
 193 See infra notes 194–229 and accompanying text (Subsection 1); infra notes 230–251 and ac-
companying text (Subsection 2). 
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1. New York’s Farm Brewery Law Violates the Dormant Commerce Clause 
The most basic formulation of the dormant Commerce Clause is that laws 
may not discriminate against out-of-state economic interests to benefit in-state 
economic interests.194 The first problem, therefore, is that despite this constitu-
tional principle, the New York law economically burdens out-of-state farmers 
in order to benefit in-state farmers.195 Under New York’s farm brewery licens-
ing scheme, out-of-state farmers are precluded from full access to the farm 
brewery market’s demand for hops and other ingredients.196 This denial is ex-
plicitly coupled with the protected access that in-state farmers enjoy—
protection that, within the decade, will be nearly total.197  
Yet speaking directly to provisions it held invalid from the very same 
Farm Winery Act on which the Farm Brewery law is modeled, the U.S. Su-
preme Court reiterated another basic principle of dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence: “The mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a producer 
in one State from access to markets in other States.”198 Shortly after, the Court 
declared unconstitutional laws that “deprive citizens of their right to have ac-
cess to the markets of other States on equal terms.”199 Thus there is little doubt 
that explicit favoring of in-state farms to the exclusion of out-of-state farms is 
directly contrary to the “equal terms” the Court is mandated to enforce.200 Just 
as the Court took issue with a requirement that an out-of-state winery would 
need to relocate to New York to fully avail itself of the New York market, so 
too would it strike a requirement that a Washington hop farmer would need to 
do the same.201 It is, as has been oft-said, of the utmost and singular im-
                                                                                                                           
194 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
 195 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 
504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533) (requiring farm breweries and brewers of “New York state 
labelled beer” to forgo increasing percentages of out-of-state ingredients); supra notes 111–137 (de-
scribing New York’s farm brewery law).  
 196 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; see supra notes 111–137 (describing New 
York’s farm brewery law and its in-state sourcing requirements). 
 197 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; see supra notes 111–137 (describing New 
York’s farm brewery law and its in-state sourcing requirements). 
 198 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472; see H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 
(1949). Notably, the aspects of the Farm Winery Act challenged and struck down in Granholm differ 
from the law currently under examination. Compare Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466–67 (outlining specific 
laws challenged in that case), with N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (New York’s farm brew-
ery law). 
 199 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473. 
 200 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473. “Discrimination” in 
the dormant Commerce Clause context occurs when in-state and out-of-state economic interests are 
treated differently; thus seeing the discriminatory nature of the New York law here in question is not 
difficult. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99; O’Grady, supra note 35, at 578. 
 201 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 475; cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) (dis-
favoring state laws that necessitate forced business relocation). 
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portance that our economy remain fluid and unencumbered.202 Thus just as the 
Court found in Granholm “no difficulty concluding” that New York and Mich-
igan laws that granted benefits to in-state wineries that it denied to out-of-state 
wineries were discriminatory, so too would it find with equal ease the New 
York farm brewery scheme equally as invalid.203 
Second, differences between the Granholm distribution law and the New 
York farm brewery law do not alleviate the latter’s fundamental constitutional 
flaws.204 For example, it is true that New York’s farm brewery law does not 
completely ban imported ingredients, but instead only partially bans sales to a 
limited sector—that is, an eventual ninety percent ban on imports to farm 
breweries only.205 This important distinction might quell out-of-state farmers’ 
concerns about access to the New York brewery market.206 Moreover, as stated, 
the farm brewery scheme is a less direct regulatory mechanism than the direct-
shipping laws in Granholm: the brewers are the ones electing to bear the more 
restrictive license.207 
But the sweeping language of Granholm’s reasoning compels the dismis-
sal of these dissimilarities, especially given the nature of the New York law 
which that case struck down.208 When analyzing the New York law specifical-
ly, the Court departed from its initial references to total obstruction and instead 
explicitly acknowledged the law’s failure to “ban direct shipments altogeth-
er.”209 It observed that out-of-state wineries could avail themselves of many of 
the same rights as in-state wineries, but that such would require establishment 
of a physical presence—thus constituting an impermissible burden on market 
access.210 Such language connotes the underlying principle that a law need not 
discriminate entirely, but merely discriminate to a degree sufficient to encum-
                                                                                                                           
 202 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472; H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 535–38; Baldwin v. G.A.F. 
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). 
 203 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 
504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533); Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476. 
 204 See supra notes 138–184 and accompanying text (showing differences between distribution 
laws struck in Granholm and the New York farm brewery law); infra notes 205–251 (showing the 
constitutional flaws of the New York law). 
 205 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a. 
 206 See id. §§ 3, 51, 51-a. That is, if out-of-state farmers can still sell to a large New York mar-
ket—especially a market enlarged by loosening permitting regulations governing traditional licen-
sees—they might be less concerned than the out-of-state wineries were in Granholm, who were out-
right forbidden from directly shipping product to consumers. Compare N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW 
§§ 3, 51, 51-a (curbing out-of-state access to only a limited sector of New York’s barley and hop 
demand), with Granholm, 544 U.S. at 470 (striking down a New York law that fully reserved access to 
the direct shipment business for in-state economic interests). 
 207 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a; Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466–67; infra notes 174–
184 and accompanying text (describing attenuation in the farm brewery law).  
 208 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472–77. 
 209 See id. at 474. 
 210 See id. at 472. 
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ber market access.211 And just as establishing a brick-and-mortar presence in 
the state was found far too great a burden, so too would be the establishment of 
an entire farm.212 
Third, the economic burdens placed on farm brewers present ample fod-
der for complaint from their perspective as well.213 In other words, the farm 
brewer is presented with a choice: they can either enjoy access to the nation’s 
hops and barley markets by applying (and paying) for the more traditional li-
cense, or instead accept the large barriers to market mandated by their current 
permit.214 This burden on full market access to out-of-state producers—simply 
because those producers are out-of-state—clearly presents, per Granholm, suf-
ficient actual discrimination for a valid constitutional challenge.215 And be-
cause Granholm’s language dismissed secondary permitting schemes as well as 
outright bans, the Court in effect maintained the well-established principle that 
distinctions—primary or secondary, direct or indirect—matter little if the law’s 
actual effect is to discriminate.216 
For example, the 1970 U.S. Supreme Court decision Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc. addressed in-state presence requirements akin to those in the farm 
brewery law.217 That case addressed an Arizona law that mandated certain 
packaging requirements for exported fruits and vegetables to “protect and en-
hance the reputation of growers within the State.”218 The secondary effect of 
this law was to require a company which grew fruit in Arizona, but imported 
the fruit into California for packaging, to establish a packaging presence in 
Arizona.219 This effect prompted a sharp response from the Court: “[T]he 
                                                                                                                           
 211 See id. 472–77. 
 212 See id.; Pike, 397 U.S. at 143 (iterating a suspicion of requirements that industries establish an 
in-state presence to avail themselves of benefits). 
 213 Cf. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 467–68. 
 214 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 
504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533). 
 215 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466–67. The law in fact mirrors, for constitutional purposes, the per-
mitting scheme described and denounced in that case. See id. (striking down N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. 
LAW §§ 3(20–a), 76–a(3) (West Supp. 2005)). 
 216 See id; see Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF. 
L. REV., 1203, 1239–1244 (1986) (listing different types and concepts of discrimination—such as 
effectual discrimination and facial discrimination—and implying there is no hierarchical order among 
them). 
 217 See 397 U.S. at 143; O’Grady, supra note 35, at 578 n.28 (“State statutes mandating the use of 
local products or services are commonly presented in dormant Commerce Clause challenges.”). 
Moreover, in Pike, the Court acknowledged the argument that a state’s in-state presence requirement 
may be justified if it served a purely regulatory, rather than economic, purpose. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 
143. This logically implies that if the primary purpose were to stimulate economic growth, these in-
state requirements would suffer even greater scrutiny. See id. Such is the precise case with the New 
York farm brewery law. See Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12 (articulating 
triumphantly the benefits that New York farms will enjoy because of the farm brewery law). 
 218 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 143. 
 219 See id. at 144. 
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Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business 
operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be 
performed elsewhere.”220 Thus, the same suspicion will befall the farm brew-
ery law given its implicit requirement that farmers be located within the state 
to avail themselves of the full New York farm brewing market, despite poten-
tially greater efficiency of those operations elsewhere.221 
More pertinently, this jurisprudence has extended explicitly to sourcing 
requirements.222 For example, in its 1992 decision Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that required in-state 
power plants to use at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal.223 Noting that 
Oklahoma in effect preferentially reserved a segment of its own coal market 
for its own miners, the Court found that such action “cannot be characterized 
as anything other than protectionist and discriminatory,” and thus a violation 
of the dormant Commerce Clause.224 Importantly, it continued to hold that the 
extent of discrimination—a “small portion” in Oklahoma’s words—has no 
bearing on the all-important fact of discrimination.225 No practical distinction 
can therefore be drawn between this invalid law and New York’s, intended as it 
is to explicitly reserve for in-state farmers almost monopolized access to farm 
breweries—no matter how small that market may eventually be.226 
Thus New York’s farm brewery law is discriminatory and, as a conse-
quence, is virtually per se invalid.227 Such discriminatory laws are nearly al-
ways founds to be fatal, as they cannot withstand the “exacting standard” ar-
ticulated in Granholm.228 The farm brewery law will not bear this standard, as 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See id. at 145. 
 221 See id.; supra notes 13, 151–154 (discussing potential economic costs to in-state sourcing 
requirements).  
 222 See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992). 
 223 See id. at 443, 461. The protectionist similarity between the farm brewery law here and the 
direct-shipment law at issue in Granholm is exemplified by this case. See O’Grady, supra note 35, at 
597–99. There is an important distinction between discrimination and protectionism, since measures 
that can be seen as protectionist in their intent—much like the New York farm brewery law which 
seeks to protect in-state farmers—often need not suffer a full discriminatory analysis as they are im-
mediately recognizable as unconstitutional. See id. Often this is an “uncomplicated task,” evidenced in 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma by Oklahoma’s candid admission that its measures were protectionist in scope. 
See id. at 597–99; see also Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 455. This bears a striking resemblance New York 
Governor Andrew Cuomo’s remarks. See Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12 
(explicitly acknowledging the law’s intention to benefit in-state farmers). 
 224 See Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 455. 
 225 Id. at 455–56. 
 226 See id. 
 227 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476; Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Den-
ning, supra note 37, at 422; see also Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99 (defining discrimination in 
the dormant Commerce Clause context). 
 228 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493. This “standard” requires that the state show no other possible 
less-discriminatory means of achieving its stated goal other than those implemented in the challenged 
law. See id. 
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there are plenty of other means of promoting an industry, simple deregulation 
just one among them.229 
2. The Second Provision of the Twenty-first Amendment Cannot Save New 
York’s Farm Brewery Law 
Because, ultimately, the New York farm brewery law regulates the intra-
state alcohol industry, application of the dormant Commerce Clause does not 
end the analysis.230 Though emasculated, the Twenty-first Amendment still 
affords at least some protection to state regulations of alcohol that violate the 
Commerce Clause.231 
Yet, the discriminatory nature of the New York farm brewery law cannot 
be cured by what are increasingly insignificant Twenty-first Amendment pro-
tections.232 This is because, according to the “modern accommodation stand-
ard,” courts reconcile the Second Provision with the dormant Commerce 
Clause by paying deference only to those state regulations that promote the 
Twenty-first Amendment’s “core concerns.”233 These “core concerns” have 
remained remarkably undefined, but have included the promotion of temper-
ance, market orderliness, and revenue—revenue typically meaning non-
discriminatory taxes or price fixations on intoxicating liquors.234 Thus even 
discriminatory laws that regulate alcohol may survive a dormant Commerce 
Clause violation.235 
                                                                                                                           
 229 See infra notes 252–268 (arguing that simple deregulation would accomplish the stated goal of 
spurring New York’s brewery-related agricultural sectors). 
 230 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw 
through L.2014, chapters 1 to 504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533). 
 231 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71; Massey, supra note 106, 
at 71–72. 
 232 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see Massey, supra note 106, at 71–72 (outlining the erosion of the 
Twenty-first Amendment’s prowess). 
 233 See Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 162–71. 
 234 See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (“The two North Dakota regula-
tions fall within the core of the State’s power under the Twenty-first Amendment. In the interest of 
promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue, the State has estab-
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control of the alcohol industry and the collection of taxes as other policies effectuated by the Twenty-
First Amendment.”); Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The core interests pro-
tected by the Twenty-first Amendment are described as the States’ interests in promoting temperance, 
ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue, all in connection with the manufacture, 
shipment, and use of alcoholic beverages.”) (internal quotations omitted); Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a 
at 162–71. 
 235 See, e.g., Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 186 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a New 
York distribution law under the Twenty-first Amendment); Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. 
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But no such central concerns are served by New York’s farm brewery 
law.236 The in-state sourcing requirement does not resemble price fixation or 
taxation and does not therefore implicate a “revenue” concern.237 Moreover, 
the law’s central purpose is the promotion of New York’s agriculture, not a 
promotion of temperance, nor is a guarantor of market orderliness.238 
Further, because it is not entirely certain that a “core concern” test is even 
necessary, discriminatory laws are unlikely to receive any deference.239 The 
U.S. Supreme Court in Granholm applied a purely traditional dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis to the challenged distribution laws, implying an even 
less deferential standard than previously applied.240 Under Granholm, the 
Court signaled that the Twenty-first Amendment simply does not protect or 
allow discrimination at all—that discrimination’s per se invalidity under the 
dormant Commerce Clause applies with equal force to alcohol.241 Thus this 
newest iteration of a long series of Twenty-first Amendment cases, couched as 
it is in a new formulation of the history of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, 
works to afford states even less deference—and all but seals the discriminatory 
farm brewery law’s fate.242 
Finally, the Twenty-first Amendment’s protection, even if its core con-
cerns were implicated, is probably weaker with regard to the sourcing re-
quirements.243 Because ultimately the farm brewery law is, as the name im-
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 238 See Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12. See generally Lauzon, supra 
note 2. The promotion of temperance, stemming from the historical context of this area of the law, is a 
core concern. See id. § 2a at 162–231; see also Silvernail, supra note 51, at 543 (noting that temper-
ance is the core concern). 
 239 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487–99. 
 240 See id. 
 241 See id. (noting the Bacchus test in passing, but not explicitly applying it); Quigley, supra note 
2, at 1886–87 (proffering an argument that Granholm has ushered in a new era of jurisprudence con-
cerning the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause). 
 242 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487–99; Quigley, supra note 2, at 1886–87. 
 243 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. Almost all cases implicating the “core concerns” of the Twen-
ty-first Amendment dealt with direct regulation of the alcohol industry—its methods, sales, im-
port/export, taxation, etc.—not ingredient sourcing methods. See, e.g., Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. 
District of Columbia, 91 F. 3d 193, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a District of Columbia law 
regarding alcohol storage requirements is valid even though it “facially violates the negative com-
merce clause” because it “is supported by a clear concern for the core enforcement function of the 
Twenty-first Amendment”); Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1310–13 (M.D. Fla. 2001) 
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plies, a law regulating brewing, the Twenty-first Amendment’s protections of 
state-level regulatory control over alcohol are implicated.244 The law in prac-
tice and purpose, however, works to directly promote and protect New York 
brewing agriculture more so than New York craft beer.245 
In other words, the farm brewery law discriminates not by directly regu-
lating alcohol, but by regulating interstate commerce in hops and other brew-
ing ingredients.246 Yet facially, the Second Provision affords no protection to 
spirits’ ingredients—only the final product stemming from those ingredients.247 
This face-saving Provision is therefore at least partly inapplicable to the farm 
brewery law, exposing a blatant intent to protect agricultural industry.248 And 
protectionist measures in agricultural industries are a primary hunting ground 
for dormant Commerce Clause attacks.249 
This material difference therefore all but eviscerates any Twenty-first 
Amendment protections with which New York would seek to clothe the law, 
and with them any hope of judicial affirmance.250 That is, without any constitu-
tional protections rooted in the Twenty-first Amendment nor any guarantee that 
                                                                                                                           
(upholding a Florida direct shipment law that prevented out of state interests from shipping to non-
permitted residents, stating that “although Florida’s statutory scheme violates the dormant commerce 
clause, it represents a permissible regulation under the Twenty–First Amendment”); Heublein, Inc. v. 
State, 351 S.E.2d 190, 196 (Ga. 1987) (upholding a Georgia law that taxed imported liquor, despite its 
violation of the Commerce Clause, because of protections afforded by the Twenty-first Amendment); 
Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 566 P. 2d at 1162–63 (finding the Twenty-first Amendment 
saved an advertising law that nonetheless interfered with interstate commerce). See generally Lauzon, 
supra note 2 (collecting cases on the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause). 
 244 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 245 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 
504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533). Indeed, the protectionist measures are focused almost entire-
ly on agricultural interests. See id. § 3. 
 246 See supra notes 194–229 (describing the mechanisms of NY’s farm brewery scheme, includ-
ing how it essentially regulates beer’s ingredients rather than the beer itself). 
 247 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 248 See id.; N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3, 51-a. But see Yablon, supra note 56, at 568– 69 
(discussing a series of cases that upheld state regulations of the nude dancing industry under the 
Twenty-first Amendment). The Supreme Court disavowed an expansive reading of the Twenty-first 
Amendment in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island. 517 U.S. 484, 515–16 (1996). See Yablon, supra 
note 56, at 575–79. In so doing, the Court implicitly reaffirmed the Twenty-first Amendment’s grant 
of power to commercial regulations of alcoholic beverages. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 514–15 
(“Section 1 of the Twenty-first Amendment repealed that prohibition, and § 2 delegated to the several 
States the power to prohibit commerce in, or the use of, alcoholic beverages. The States’ regulatory 
power over this segment of commerce is therefore largely unfettered by the Commerce Clause. As is 
clear, the text of the Twenty-first Amendment supports the view that, while it grants the States author-
ity over commerce that might otherwise be reserved to the Federal Government, it places no limit 
whatsoever on other constitutional provisions.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 249 See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S at 526 (concerning milk products); Pike, 397 U.S. at 138 
(concerning commercial farming). 
 250 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476 (noting per se invalidity). 
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such protections would even matter, the violative law is bound to break under-
neath the immense weight of a great constitutional silence.251 
B. The Simpler Path: Deregulation 
To avoid constitutional infirmities, New York and other states should in-
stead promote craft beer through simple deregulation.252 An across-the-board 
release of regulatory strictures does not implicate constitutional principles if 
effectuated evenhandedly.253 Moreover, a releasing of market forces—and a 
shedding of the outdated ideology in which these laws are steeped—would 
better stimulate growth not just nationally, but locally as well.254 For such is 
the very nature of the craft beer revolution: a return to locality.255 
The unconstitutionality of New York’s farm brewery scheme does not 
stem from legislative intent to promote craft beer.256 Indeed, the promotion and 
fostering of the craft beer industry and its revolution is a noble thing and 
should be a legislator’s goal.257 The unconstitutionality of the farm brewery 
scheme stems instead from its protectionist means of promoting craft beer.258 It 
is not that New York’s nascent and resurgent hop and barley industries should 
not be promoted, nor that regulations should not be lifted from smaller brewer-
ies, but instead that such goals can only be legally accomplished in a non-
discriminatory fashion that fosters the growth of the entire brewing communi-
                                                                                                                           
 251 Cf. id.; see supra notes 194–250 and accompanying text (explaining the unconstitutionality of 
the farm brewery license). 
 252 See Tamayo, supra note 56, at 2232–48 (suggesting a variety of ways North Carolina might 
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 255 See History of Craft Brewing, supra note 4. 
 256See supra notes 190–229 and accompanying text (explaining the unconstitutionality of New 
York’s farm brewery law without attributing that unconstitutionality to the law’s underlying intention 
to promote the art of craft beer). 
 257 See Tamayo, supra note 56, at 2228 (noting ample legislative recognition of the merits of craft 
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 258 See supra notes 190–229 and accompanying text (outlining the unconstitutionality of discrim-
inatory means). 
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ty.259 This is the only means by which the legislature can help foster growth 
without inviting litigation.260 The promotion of farms must be done constitu-
tionally, without implicating that balkanization the Supreme Court is mandated 
to prevent.261 State laws simply cannot exclude one another and remain un-
challenged.262 
Further, the simplicity of locality should serve as thematic inspiration: the 
immense patchwork of laws regulating the alcohol industry certainly testify to 
a need for a simpler marketplace.263 One sector ripe for a loosening of control 
could be distribution and retail, which is already taking place across the coun-
try.264 In New York this could mean granting all craft beer those privileges ex-
tended to farm breweries—as New York began to do in recent amendments—
and allowing the industries to promote themselves.265 New York has a rich 
hop-growing heritage, and with the ever-increasing creativity of craft beer 
throughout the country, it is all but certain ample demand for New York hops 
will be generated with their continued expansion and redevelopment.266 There 
is thus no need for protectionism.267 The law should remove barriers to growth, 
not create them.268 
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CONCLUSION 
The craft beer revolution is incredible. The industry has grown at impres-
sive rates and has contributed enormously to localities and culture. It ought to 
be fostered, celebrated, encouraged, and experienced—and though its past is 
storied, its future is brighter. 
The legislative context of the revolution, however, is highly complex. 
America’s misguided but “Noble Experiment” with Prohibition—and its tu-
multuous relationship with alcohol generally—has birthed a patchwork system 
of state and federal laws clothed with the essence of an era when wholesalers 
were many and small, breweries few and large, distrust rampant, and product 
summarily indiscernible. The era has passed, but the legislative legacy largely 
endures. 
New York and other states have tried to adapt. New York created a farm-
brewery license, for example, which loosened regulations for breweries sourc-
ing in-state ingredients. This particular mechanism, however, discriminates 
against interstate commerce and is consequently invalid. Thus the better path 
forward is to continue loosening regulatory strictures without also creating ad-
ditional burdens. New York took steps in this direction by allowing all brewers 
to sell their beer by the glass, but failed to address the underlying constitution-
al concerns.  
Thus as states adapt to this new era of craft beer (and craft cider, liquor, 
and wine), they must be certain to do so in ways that do not perpetuate the 
state-by-state legislative fragmentation of the post-Prohibition era. In New 
York’s case, a court could ensure just that. But where laws and courts are si-
lent, states should refuse legislative instincts, abdicate more authority vested in 
them by the Twenty-first Amendment, and merely open—for as regulatory bar-
riers are removed, the creativity, the culture, and the beer will flow and flow 
well. 
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